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FREE SPEECH AND OBEDIENCE TO LAW
Frederick Schauer*
I.
Several generations ago Alexander Meiklejohn asserted that
among the virtues of a regime of freedom of speech was its
connection with the obligation to obey the law.1 More specifically,
Meiklejohn maintained not only that the right to voice
disagreements with laws was a morally and politically necessary
condition of compelling people to obey laws with which they
disagreed, but seemed to imply as well that people would in fact
be more inclined to obey those laws when they were given the
opportunity to object than would be the case were their dissenting
voices to be stifled by official action.
The relationship between democratic legitimacy and
freedom of speech has subsequently been the subject of analyses
offered by Ronald Dworkin,2 by Robert Post,3 and, most recently,
by James Weinstein in this Symposium4 and elsewhere.5
Weinstein in particular advances our understanding of the issue
by drawing on the venerable distinction between normative

* David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of
Virginia.
1. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 10–11 (1948). See also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 100 (1960).
2. RONALD DWORKIN, Foreword, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY vii
(Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009). Dworkin’s views on democratic legitimacy are
elaborated in JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011).
3. ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2014); ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY,
COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 280–88 (1995); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Status of
Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (2000).
4. James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy, 32
CONST. COMMENT. 527 (2017).
5. James Weinstein, Free Speech and Political Legitimacy: A Response to Ed Baker,
27 CONST. COMMENT. 361 (2011).
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legitimacy and descriptive (or sociological) legitimacy.6
Normative legitimacy is a process-based philosophical idea,7 and
designates or describes those forms of governmental organization
and governmental action that are right, or just, as matter of
political philosophy. The idea is normative and not empirical, and
a government or its actions are legitimate insofar as they are
democratic, or egalitarian, or deliberative, or in some other way
built on normatively desirable foundations. More specifically,
normative legitimacy typically is taken as referring to the
conditions permitting the political state to justifiably demand
obedience from its citizens, and thus to impose its laws on those
who refuse to obey.8
If we understand normative legitimacy as a fundamentally
non-consequentialist and non-instrumental idea, and if we
understand it as focused primarily on procedure in the broadest
sense of that word, then we can say that a normatively desirable
form of governmental organization is to be preferred independent
of the value of the consequences that may flow from adopting it.
We might believe, for example, that majoritarian democracy is a
good in itself, and that it has moral merits as a form of decisionmaking independent of whether it produces better policies, or
more citizen happiness, or more truth, or anything else.9 And thus
we might believe, as Weinstein plainly does believe, that allowing
6. An excellent overview of the issues and the literature is Fabienne Peter, Politcal
Legitimacy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/legitimacy (2016). See also THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY: EMERGING
PERSPECTIVES ON IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS (John T. Jost &
Brenda Major eds., 2001). In the legal literature, valuable contributions include Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005); Michael L.
Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1011 (2007).
7. I say “process-based” to distinguish a notion of legitimacy that is largely or
entirely dependent on the substantive rightness of an outcome (see, e.g., PHILIP PETTIT,
JUDGING JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 75103 (1980)) from a notion that focuses on the way in which outcomes are generated.
Because it is not clear that the former notion adds anything to the idea of substantive
rightness (or justice), I understand legitimacy to refer to the way in which outcomes are
produced, thus leaving conceptual (and empirical) space for legitimately produced but
substantively wrong outcomes.
8. See STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN 105 (3d ed. 2013); Tom R. Tyler,
Psychology and the Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 711, 716–
17 (Keith E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008).
9. On the distinction between the instrumentally and the intrinsically valuable as
arguments for democratic decision-making (and, implicitly, for any other form of
governmental organization), see WILLIAM N. NELSON, ON JUSTIFYING DEMOCRACY
(1980).
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people to object to policies with which they disagree is a necessary
component of normative legitimacy, and thus of the warrant of
the state to enforce its directives by coercive means. From this
perspective, normative legitimacy stands in no need of
consequential, instrumental, or empirical justification. It is simply
a matter of first-order political morality. In offering this claim,
Weinstein seems largely correct, even though it might be plausible
to argue that a democracy exists when people have the right to
vote for their representatives, or have the right to vote on matters
of policy, and that, especially in a representative rather than direct
democracy, the right of the citizen to speak out is not a necessary
condition of democratic legitimacy itself as long as the citizen can
be part of choosing those who will represent her.10
Although there are substantial difficulties with treating
representation as a sufficient condition for either democracy or
legitimacy, I mention that position here only to highlight the fact
that tying freedom of speech to normative legitimacy needs some
argument, and that a strong and continuous right to freedom of
speech is not entailed by the very idea of democracy, at least as
long as the idea of representative democracy is not an oxymoron.
Still, it seems difficult to imagine a process of selecting
representatives or policies that is not crucially facilitated by direct
citizen speech, and it seems even more difficult to imagine
government by the people that does not permit those people to
participate in policy-making outside of the episodic process of
voting.11 As a result, the connection between freedom of

10. Of some relevance here is the distinction between trustee and delegate models of
representation. See SUZANNE DOVI, THE GOOD REPRESENTATATIVE (2007); HANNA
PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967); Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking
Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515 (2003). Under a delegate model,
representatives are expected to represent the actual wishes of their constituents, but under
a trustee model the representative is to advance her constituents’ best interests,
independent of their actual expressed wishes, just as the trustee of an estate should aim to
maximize the value of the estate in the interest of the beneficiaries but need not take
instructions from the beneficiaries as to how to do so. The value of freedom of citizen
communication outside of the electoral process is thus more closely connected with a
delegate than a trustee model, and arguments for free speech founded on continuous
communication between citizens and their representatives thus implicitly incorporate
much of the delegate model of representation. See Frederick Schauer, Constitutions of
Hope and Fear, 124 YALE L.J. 528 (2014) (book review).
11. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 24143 (1995).
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(political12) speech and democratic decision-making emerges as a
close one, entailed by a wide range of views about simply what it
is governmental decisions to be made by as well as for the
citizenry. Insofar as democracy is itself desirable, therefore, its
components are necessarily so, and thus the argument is not so
much that freedom of speech is a consequence of democracy or a
facilitator of democracy as it is that freedom of speech is arguably
simply part of the definition of what democracy and democratic
legitimacy just are. It is not clear to me that translating this basic
proposition of normative political philosophy into the language of
“legitimacy” adds very much, but this is largely a terminological
quibble. The basic point, regardless of the language we use to
describe it, is that freedom of political speech is normatively
justifiable as a necessary component of a normatively justifiable
form of governance in which citizens have substantial input by
voting and otherwise into the decisions that will affect them and
that will control their activities.
II.
Although both this Symposium and much of the discussion
of legitimacy takes place in the context of debates over laws
prohibiting so-called hate speech, I will say very little about hate
speech here. Rather, I will address more generally a range of
issues that are (contingently) implicated by some of the issues in
the hate speech debate, but my focus will be on the general issues
and not on hate speech. One reason for skirting the hate speech
controversy is that the issues of legitimacy, and of the relationship
between freedom of speech and political legitimacy, are far
broader than the question of hate speech in particular. But
12. For Meiklejohn, the argument for freedom of speech as a consequence of
compelling people to obey governmental decisions with which they disagree produced the
conclusion that only political speech – speech directed to questions of governmental
organization or policy – was protected by the First Amendment. Meiklejohn, supra note 1.
See also Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245; A considerable amount of subsequent commentary has engaged with Meiklejohn on
this question, often arguing that a great deal of art and literature, among other topics and
genres, is also relevant to public policy, causing Meiklejohn’s distinction between the
political and the personal to collapse. See, e.g., Harry Kelven, Jr., The New York Times
Case: A Note on the “Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191;
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990).
This is an interesting and important debate, but its relevance to the relationship between
legitimacy and obedience is at best tangential, and so I will do no more than note it here.
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although the issue of hate speech is but one instantiation of the
topic of free speech generally and of free speech and legitimacy
more particularly, the hate speech question has both a high degree
of political salience and a substantial amount of ideological
valence. Consequently there exists some risk that the analysis of
interesting and important questions about the relationship
between political legitimacy and freedom of speech will be both
crowded out and distorted by discussing them in the context of the
contentious subject of hate speech. We know from the literature
on the availability heuristic that that which is most salient may
distort our appreciation of the full range of issues that some
principle or decision may encompass,13 and we know from the
research on motivated reasoning that an antecedent preference
for a an outcome may influence the analysis of the considerations
that would lead to accepting or rejecting that outcome.14
Accordingly, it seems preferable to discuss the broader
philosophical and empirical questions about free speech and
legitimacy in a discursive environment in which the participating
discussants have few ideological or political priors, or at least are
thinking about a wide range of applications, but the hate speech
debate is decidedly not such an environment. And thus because I
find the issue of the relationship between freedom of speech and
political legitimacy independently important and interesting, I
prefer to avoid rather than embrace, at least here, the distractions
of the hate speech controversy.15
In addition, discussions of hate speech necessarily
presuppose empirical as well as philosophical questions about the
consequences of such speech. Tellingly, Dworkin, Weinstein, and
13. The seminal source on the availability heuristic is Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COG.
PSYCH. 207 (1973). See also SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, The Availability Bias in Social
Perception and Interaction, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 190 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
14. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCH. BULL. 489
(1990). See also Peter H. Ditto et al., Motivated Moral Reasoning, 50 PSYCH. LEARNING &
MOTIVATION 307 (2009); Keith E. Stanovich et al., Myside Bias, Rational Thinking, and
Intelligence, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 259 (2013).
15. My reluctance to situate the legitimacy question within the concrete,
controversial, political, and highly salient questions about hate speech is also part of a
larger concern about the risks of making (or arguing about) general policies or general
principles in the looming shadow of immediate and important problems. See Frederick
Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law,? 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006); FREDERICK SCHAUER
& RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, The Trouble with Cases, in REGULATION VS. LITIGATION:
PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW 45 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011).
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many other opponents of hate speech laws describe the object of
such laws as the desire on the part of government to suppress that
with which it disagrees or that with which people take offense.16
By contrast, most proponents of hate speech laws describe the
object of such laws as the prevention of harm.17 In the face of this
important terminological and substantive difference about how to
characterize the consequences of racial insults, endorsements of
sexual violence, and Holocaust denials, for example, an initial and
necessary question is thus the very nature of such consequences,
a question whose empirical dimensions cannot be avoided.18
Consider, for example, Weinstein’s claim that imposing tax
laws on those who disagree with the taxes is legitimate only if
those who object to such laws have the opportunity to articulate
their objections.19 But suppose, quite realistically,20 that there
exists a highly secret algorithm employed by the Internal Revenue
Service to determine whom to audit, the possession of which
would enable taxpayers with almost complete certainty to avoid
detection for plainly unlawful tax avoidance. Under such
circumstances, would a prohibition on disclosing the algorithm—
a prohibition on aiding and abetting unlawful tax avoidance—
eliminate or diminish the obligation of those who disagreed with
the tax to comply?21 If not, then the only relevant distinction
16.
17.

Weinstein, supra note 4, at 527.
See, for example, most of the contribution in SPEECH AND HARM:
CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH (Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan eds., 2012).
On harm and free speech more generally, see Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First
Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81.
18. To observe that there are empirical questions about the nature of the harms
caused by hate speech is not to deny that there are also conceptual questions. For example,
the emotional and psychological consequences of a race-based insult directed at an
individual are different in kind (putting aside questions of degree) from race-based
incitements to violence, discrimination, and other forms of independently unlawful
activity. See Frederick Schauer, The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 ETHICS 635
(1993); Schauer, supra note 17.
19. Weinstein, supra note 4, at 530.
20. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 159–
67 (2003).
21. For purposes of the example, nothing turns on whether the prohibition targets
only IRS employees or others who might be in possession of such information. As a matter
of existing First Amendment doctrine, publication of unlawfully obtained information by
one who was not a participant in the original illegality is protected. See Bartnicki v. Vopper,
532 U.S. 514 (2001); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). But even if the
prohibition in my hypothetical example extended to everyone in possession of the
algorithm, it is difficult to see how this would affect the obligation of citizens to pay their
taxes.

7 - SCHAUER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

FREE SPEECH & OBEDIENCE TO LAW

10/7/17 3:32 PM

667

between this example and the hate speech scenario is an alleged
closer empirical connection between this form of aiding and
abetting tax avoidance and the act of actual tax avoidance than
there is between facilitating, causing or constituting racial or
ethnic or religious or sexual orientation discrimination by words
and the actual practice of such discrimination. But whether there
is such a difference is exactly the matter in issue, and thus it is
question-begging to assume at the outset that hate speech is
neither harmful in itself or of lesser consequence than the verbal
aiding and abetting of conventional criminal activity. If hate
speech just is an act of racial (or other unlawful) discrimination,22
or if it is as causally connected with unlawful acts of discrimination
as publishing the IRS algorithm is with unlawful tax evasion, then
it is hard to see why the demands of legitimacy require permitting
the objector to engage in the very practice that is prohibited,
which is the point of the tax evasion example. Now it may be that
there are important differences between the two examples, but
those differences need to be explained and justified, empirically
as well as conceptually and normatively. And thus the tax evasion
example serves as a caution against simply assuming at the outset
that hate speech is not itself an act of discrimination or is not as
closely causally connected with acts of discrimination as
disclosure of the IRS algorithm is with tax evasion.23 And because
this is not the forum for delving into these difficult empirical
questions, I prefer to leave hate speech aside rather than to
assume the answers to empirical questions about which the
conceptual framing is complex and the data are at best
inconclusive.

22. On the possibility that hate speech is constitutive rather than causal of
discrimination, see RAE LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON
PORNOGRAPHY AND OBJECTIFICATION (2009); CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY
WORDS (1993). The claim is controversial, but does bear an interesting affinity with the
conclusions about discrimination in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See
Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,
1990 DUKE L.J. 431.
23. Indeed, although it is often stated that government is suppressing opinions with
which it disagrees, actual instances of suppression justified on such grounds are virtually
non-existent. When government suppresses, it almost always claims that it is doing so to
prevent some harm, and not just to suppress disagreement. Government may frequently
be mistaken in that assessment, and it is important to discuss the soundness (or not) of
such claims. But to assume at the outset that the basis for suppression is disagreement is to
frame the issue in such a way as to avoid precisely such discussion.
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III.
Specific questions about hate speech aside, therefore, the
question – or at least one question, and the one I address here – is
whether the possession of a right to object to a regulatory law with
which one disagrees will increase the likelihood that the
disagreeing citizen will comply with the law despite her
disagreement. This question is closely connected with the
question of descriptive legitimacy as Weinstein articulates it, but
is not identical to it, for reasons that are worth closer inspection.
To repeat what was noted above, we are no longer in the
realm of normative legitimacy. At least for the sake of argument,
I will accept that allowing citizens to express their individual (as
opposed to doing so through their representatives) disagreement
with a law is a necessary condition for that law’s normative
legitimacy, and thus for the citizen’s obligation to comply with
that law just because it is a law. Such an assumption presupposes,
pace the philosophical anarchists,24 that there are at least some
laws that should be obeyed even in the face of first-order (or
content-based) disagreement just because those laws are law. And
if there are such laws—if the very fact of law independent of the
content of the law provides a reason to obey it25—then the
normative legitimacy question is whether the opportunity to
object is a member of the set of necessary conditions for that law
to generate an obligation to comply on the part of the subject who
believes such a law morally or otherwise mistaken.26 My
24. See, e.g., CHAIM GANS, PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM AND POLITICAL
DISOBEDIENCE (1992); ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970); A.
JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1979); A. JOHN
SIMMONS, Philosophical Anarchism, in FOR AND AGAINST THE STATE: NEW
PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS 19 (John T. Sanders & Jan Narveson eds., 1996); M.B.E.
Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950 (1973).
25. As maintained by a long line of thinkers, from Socrates to Locke to Rawls and
beyond. See William Edmundson, State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law, 10 LEGAL
THEORY 215 (2004); LESLIE GREEN, Law and Obligations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002); GEORGE KLOSKO, The Moral Obligation to Obey the Law, in THE ROUTLEDGE
COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 511 (2012).
26. To put the same issue in different words, the question is about the identity of the
properties that an official directive (perhaps calling it a “law” is question-begging) most
possess in order for it to ground a content-independent (prima facie) obligation of
compliance compliance. It is worth emphasizing that even the philosophical anarchist
believes that there is an obligation to refrain from murder, sexual assault, theft, dangerous
driving, and the like, but believes that this obligation arises from those acts being morally
wrong independent of their legal prohibition. As a result, it is useful in isolating the issue
to bear in mind the image of the person who believes that the law’s prohibitions or
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assumption here is that freedom publicly to object is indeed one
of those conditions, although, as discussed above, it is hardly selfevident that such an assumption is warranted.
With that assumption in hand, we can then turn from
normative to descriptive legitimacy. But the question of
descriptive legitimacy is not as straightforward as some, including
Weinstein here, believe. Specifically, the descriptive question on
which I focus is whether allowing objectors to object will increase
the likelihood of compliance with the laws to which they object.
Will those who disagree with a law find compliance “more
acceptable” than they would absent an opportunity to participate
in a decision that turned out to go against their preferences or
their own considered judgments?27 But although this looks like
one question, it is in fact three questions, and it will be valuable
to attempt to distinguish them.
The first question is the “wholesale” question whether
people who live in a society in which dissent is permitted are more
likely to believe that they have a moral obligation to obey the law
than are people who live in a society in which dissent is restricted,
controlling for all other possible differences. As with most other
questions of comparative law, comparative political theory, and
comparative public opinion, the presence of countless variables
makes anything even approaching a conclusive answer virtually
impossible. Still, and relying most on the research done by Tom
Tyler and his collaborators on the relationship between a person’s
sense of governmental legitimacy and her inclinations to obey
laws and officials,28 we might conclude that the answer to this

mandates are mistaken. If there is an obligation to obey the law qua law, then the subject
who believes a law to be mistaken, whether as a matter of morality or policy or something
else, would still have a (sanction-independent as well as content-independent) obligation
to comply.
27. On the “more acceptable” framing, which is somewhat ambiguous about whether
it refers to what people will think and what people will actually do, see AMY GUTMANN &
DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 10 (2004).
28. See especially TOM R. TYLER. WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2d ed., 2006). See
also Tyler, supra note 8; Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A
Psychological Perspective, 29 NYU J. INT’L LAW & POLITICS 29 (1997); Tom R. Tyler,
Beyond Self-Interest: Why People Obey Laws and Accept Judicial Decisions, THE
RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 44 (Fall 1998). Of special relevance is Tom R. Tyler,
Understanding the Force of Law, 51 TULSA L. REV. 507 (2015), in which Tyler responds to
the criticisms of some of his conclusions that I offered in FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE
FORCE OF LAW (2015), and which I draw on here. This is not the place to continue my
debate with Tyler, but it would be wrong to deny the existence of that debate or his
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question is in the affirmative. Although Tyler’s indicia of
governmental legitimacy do not explicitly include the kind of
opportunity for public dissent that is at the heart of the question
on the table in this Symposium and this Article, it is a reasonable
extrapolation from the indicia that Tyler does include that people
who live in a society in which the laws are made publicly and
democratically, and in which people have the opportunity publicly
to dissent from those laws with which they disagree, will be more
likely to believe that there is a general obligation to obey laws
with which they disagree than those who live in a society in which
such earmarks of legitimacy are absent.
Let us further assume an affirmative answer to this wholesale
question. That is, let us assume that belief in a general obligation
to obey the law will increase when people are allowed to object to
the laws with which they disagree. But even if this is so, further
questions remain. The second question, therefore, is whether
people who believe in a general—abstract, or wholesale—
obligation to obey the law will feel a “retail” obligation to obey
specific laws with which they disagree—specific laws whose
content they find objectionable. And here the reliance on Tyler,
including Weinstein’s, becomes more problematic. Because all
but one of Tyler’s survey questions fail to distinguish between
laws with which people agree from laws with which they disagree,
he is able to conclude that the chief factor in determining belief in
an obligation to obey a specific law is the moral content of that
law.29 The moral desirability of a law is undoubtedly an important
factor in explaining why people might believe that they should
obey a law that disadvantages them personally, but it says little
about people’s beliefs about laws they find mistaken, whether on
moral or policy grounds.30 In the context of compliance issues
generally, this might be only a minor problem, as there is good
reason to be interested in the sanction-independent grounds for
compliance with personally disadvantageous laws that people find
generally desirable, including many of the laws about, for
example, taxes and driving. But the free speech question arises
disagreements—some conceptual and some empirical—with some of the arguments that I
offer here.
29. See Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 28, at 224;
Tyler, Beyond Self-Interest, supra note 28, at 45.
30. Tyler’s research is explicitly and carefully criticized on precisely these grounds in
LESLIE GREEN, Who Believes in Political Obligation?, in FOR AND AGAINST THE STATE
1, 10–24 (John T. Sanders & Jan Narveson eds., 1996).
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explicitly in the context of disagreements about the content of our
laws, and the claim I am addressing is that those who object to a
law—and not just those who are disadvantaged by a law to which
they do not in the abstract object—will be more likely to comply
when they have been afforded an opportunity to object to the
passage or enforcement of that law. And on this question, the
conflation of the moral and the legal is of determinative
importance. If people profess to be willing without the necessity
of sanction to comply with laws whose content they find morally
agreeable, then it is hard to see why giving them an opportunity
to object to such laws will have any effect on the degree of their
willingness to comply.
Although this problem affects and infects the ability to infer
a belief in the willingness to comply with an objectionable law
from a willingness to comply with laws that subjects find morally
desirable, Tyler’s research does include one question focused on
the professed willingness of people to comply with laws whose
content they find objectionable.31 And here he similarly finds that
people claim to be more willing to comply with such objectionable
(to them) laws if they have been made under conditions of
procedural legitimacy.32 Again. Tyler does not explicitly include
freedom to object publicly within his set of conditions, but he
comes close by including citizen input within his definition of
legitimacy, and thus Weinstein’s extrapolation seems entirely
reasonable. Accordingly, we might conclude from Weinstein’s
gloss on Tyler’s research that people profess to have a greater
willingness to comply with laws with which they disagree when
they have been given an opportunity to express that disagreement
publicly than when such disagreement is in some way restricted or
prohibited. This is the question of free speech and legitimacy as
applied to particular laws, and now we are much closer to
addressing the precise question that I consider here, that
Meiklejohn, Dworkin, Post, and others have addressed implicitly,
and that Weinstein here addresses most directly and explicitly.
Thus, it appears from Tyler’s research to be the case that giving
people an opportunity to object to laws with which they disagree
31. TYLER, supra note 28, at 46.
32. With respect to this question, Tyler does not appear to exclude the fear of
sanctions, and thus the answers to this question may not be as supportive of his general
program and conclusions as he believes. But this is a side issue on the free speech question,
so I will say no more about it here.

7 - SCHAUER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

672

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

10/7/17 3:32 PM

[Vol. 32:661

will not only increase their belief in the legitimacy of the system
as a whole, and not only increase their belief in the legitimacy of
laws that that system has made, but will also increase their belief
in an obligation to obey even those particular laws they find
objectionable.33
It is at this point, however, that Tyler’s survey research, and
Weinstein’s reliance on it, stops short of answering the ultimate
question—will people who claim to believe in the obligation to
obey laws with which they disagree, and who in fact believe that
they have an obligation to obey such laws, actually obey such laws.
And here we must confront the distinction between what people
believe they ought to do and what they actually do. I believe, for
example, that I ought to lose weight, but in the face of baconinspired temptation my genuine beliefs give way. Similarly, we
ought to be interested in whether people who believe they ought
to follow laws with which they disagree will in fact follow them
when the “temptation” to disobey is present, a temptation that
will occur with considerable frequency within the set of laws that
people find objectionable. If we are now focused on laws with
which people disagree, it should come as little surprise that such
laws will often present for people situations in which the law says
one thing and their own all-things-except-the-law-considered
judgment says something else. There is less research on this
question than we might wish, and this is not the occasion to delve
into it, in part because I have done so previously and elsewhere. 34
But even if people believe that there is an obligation to obey those
laws with which they disagree, it should be no more surprising that
this abstract belief is under-reflected in actual practice than there
is that the abstract belief in the desirability of weight loss is underreflected in actual practice.

33. Defenders of (some) hate-speech regulations could (and do) argue that
restrictions on invective, epithets, insults, and the like would not interfere with the ability
of people to object to laws in more civil terms. This is a more than plausible response to
Weinstein and others, but a plausible rejoinder is that the response presupposes too much
of a distinction between the propositional content of an objection and the style or language
in which the objection is couched. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Resolving
this genuine dispute is not germane to my principal point in this Article, so I will do no
more than note it here, and note that a Cohen-inspired conflation between content and
style may need more justification and explanation than is typically found in much of the
literature objecting to hate-speech laws.
34. See SCHAUER, supra note 28, at 57–74, 197–205.
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This is not to say that the claims about the relationship
between an opportunity to object and the incidence of compliance
have been falsified. It is only to say that they have not been
established, and that the research that might be understood to
establish them turns out not to do so. The question of descriptive
or sociological legitimacy is important, but we must distinguish a
description of belief from a description of behavior. Even if it is
the case that freedom of speech increases the degree of belief in
the legitimacy of law, and belief in the obligation to obey
disagreeable laws, on the question of whether freedom of speech
increases actual compliance with laws with which people disagree,
the best we can do is simply to say that we do not know.
IV.
The relationship between a regime of freedom of speech and
political legitimacy is important, even more important—or at least
more pervasive—than the question of hate speech. The larger
issue is the soundness of what we might label the “due process”
argument for freedom of speech. Just as most developed legal
traditions consider it a requirement of procedural justice that
those who are to be punished or otherwise sanctioned by the legal
system have an opportunity to speak on their own behalf prior to
the imposition of the sanction—we call it procedural due process
in the United States, and the English refer to audi alteram partem
(hear the other side) as a fundamental principal of natural
justice35—so too might we generalize from this to the possibility
that something analogous to due process grounds the right to
speak out against even a general law before one is bound by the
force of the state to obey it.
In considering the legitimacy based due process argument for
freedom of speech, Weinstein has valuably advanced the inquiry
by urging us in considering this question to distinguish between
normative and descriptive/sociological legitimacy. But once we do
address the vital topic of descriptive legitimacy, we see that there
is a difference between the empirical fact of a belief in legitimacy
and the empirical fact of the behavior that might flow from such a
belief. Because theorists from Meiklejohn to Weinstein have
supplemented their broader normative claims with more or less
35. See Frederick Schauer, English Natural Justice and American Due Process, 18
WM. & MARY L. REV. 47 (1976).
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specific empirical claims that one justification for freedom of
speech is that it will increase the degree of sanction-independent
legal compliance with laws with which people disagree, this
Symposium has seemed the ideal occasion to address that
particular claim. The claim is interesting and important, and, if
sound, would provide another foundation for a democracyfocused account of freedom of speech. But at the moment we have
little basis for believing it sound, even if it were good were it to be
so.

